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Trade Unions and the 2016 UK European Union Referendum 
 
 
 
Dr Ian Fitzgerald, Professor Ron Beadle and Kevin Rowan 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article reports on pre and post interviews with trade union leaders and senior Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) and union officials who held campaign responsibilities for the 2016 
UK European Union (EU) Referendum.  We consider the development of union policy 
towards the EU, the determination of unions’ final positions, campaign resources and media, 
the arguments made and the drivers of and constraints upon active campaigning.  Campaign 
intensity, resourcing and strategic decision-making varied widely across unions and was 
frustrated by resource constraints, fear of alienating members and in some cases lack of 
priority.  We conclude that unions must be better prepared to commit material resources and 
national officers’ time so that campaign issues are effectively framed in terms of member 
concerns. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite the narrow margin of the Leave victory in 2016 and the critical role played by 
working class voters in the result (Clarke et al., 2017); little attention has been paid to the 
trade union role in the Referendum campaign in either academic research (Mckenzie, 2017) or 
popular accounts (Oliver, 2016).  A similar inattentiveness marked the Trade Unions’ role in 
the 1975 Referendum on entry into the European Economic Community (EEC); no studies 
were published in leading industrial relations journals of the time with only one account 
subsequently identified (Whyman, 2008).  Our research sought firstly to examine the key 
influences on both material and argumentative resources in trade unions on both sides of the 
Referendum campaign and the UK union federation the Trade Union Congress (TUC).  
Secondly, we examined trade union post-Referendum evaluations of the effectiveness of their 
campaigning. 
Whilst the pledge for a Referendum had been made in the 2015 Conservative manifesto 
with paving legislation passed later that year, the date of the Referendum remained a closely 
guarded secret until its announcement by Prime Minister Cameron on the 20th February 2016 
(BBC, 2016).  Although most union policy positions favoured remaining in the European 
Union (EU), the TUC and many leading unions had reserved their position on the 
Referendum until the outcome of negotiations on revisions to British membership.  In the 
event, these were concluded days before the announcement of the Referendum date.  The 
absence of further dilutions of workers’ rights in the agreed package was sufficient to 
convince the TUC and the majority of affiliates to declare for Remain. 
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The narrow timescale thereafter gave trade unions and other interested parties two 
months to prepare campaign plans and materials before the formal start of campaigning on the 
15th April.  The confirmation of the formal lead organisations (Britain Stronger in Europe and 
Vote Leave) by the Electoral Commission took place just two days before the start of 
campaigning.  Over the next eight weeks, campaign expenditure reached some £32.6m 
(Electoral Commission, 2019) and the result saw the highest vote ever recorded in the UK 
with 16,141,241 Remain voters defeated by 17,410,742 voting Leave.  The 123 registered 
campaigners included just eight of the TUC’s 50 affiliated unions.  This is somewhat 
misleading however as registered unions spent over £1million, overwhelmingly supporting 
Remain.  Though, perhaps expressing unions weight in the overall campaign this was 5% of 
total registered Remain spending and only 0.3% of Leave spending (Electoral Commission, 
2019).  Of the Trades Unions’ 6,493,000 members (TUC, 2017), approximately 60% 
(3,916,000) belonged to unions that incurred spend in the Referendum. 
This article provides findings from synchronous interviews conducted with 11 senior 
officers responsible for trade union and TUC campaigns during the Referendum and post- 
Referendum.  These insider accounts examine the formation of trade union policy, campaign 
media, structure and themes, influences on decision-making and post-Referendum evaluation 
of campaign effectiveness.  The next part outlines the history of UK trade unions’ policy 
towards EU membership and considers explanatory accounts; part three presents methods and 
purposive sampling procedures; the fourth and fifth parts present the main findings from the 
interviews conducted during and following the Referendum and the final part discusses the 
results and draws conclusions for future union campaigning. 
 
 
Trade Union Policy and the European Union 
 
Trade union policy towards the EU underwent a significant shift from the late 1980s.  The 
TUC and an overwhelming majority of unions had opposed Britain’s membership in the 1975 
EEC Referendum.  At that time, the developing European single market threatened sectoral 
and national bargaining structures, which then dominated wage setting (Brown, 1985; 
Whyman, 2008), supporting unions and employers associations alike (Gooberman et al., 
2019).  From the mid 1980s there has been a decline in union membership, density and 
collective bargaining, often precipitated by defeats in significant industrial disputes, a hostile 
state and a far less conducive legislative environment (Freeman and Pelletier, 1990; Coderre-
LaPalme and Greer, 2017).  Most recently the Trade Union Act 2016, the same year as the 
Referendum continues the ‘…authoritarian style of Conservative ideology and statecraft’ 
(Bogg, 2016: 299).  Bogg’s legal argument about the repercussions of this Bill for trade 
unions, suggests that British liberal democracy is in a fragile state (ibid: 336).  In this context, 
the EU has appeared to offer some protection and influence for workers and unions. 
The 1988 address of the then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors to 
the TUC Congress is rightly regarded as a reference point for the growing significance of the 
EU to UK unions.  Mitchell (2012: 42–43) argues that the TUC was ‘…one of the most anti-
EC union organizations in Europe, since 1988 the TUC has become one of the most vocal 
supporters’.  Hyman (2008) discusses the importance of all types of EU social legislation 
noting ‘…that British labour law today would be very different but for EU membership’ (ibid: 
27).  However, support for ‘social Europe’ and the corporatism that influenced the extension 
of European Works Councils (EWCs) was never universal.  If we accept the accuracy of 
Mathers et al.’s (2018) description of British unions as pragmatic Europeans (see also Hyman, 
2017), then the positive relationship between trade union support for the EU and the 
protections afforded by it becomes clear.  Overall, though, three main strands underpinned 
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trade union policy towards the EU – policy and lobbying in Brussels, transnational campaigns 
and social dialogue. 
Firstly, Mitchell (2012: 39–40) provides details of the TUC office established in Brussels 
in 1993; a Europe Monitoring Group who conveyed union European positions to this Brussels 
office; and a Network Europe Contact Point to inform unions and the TUC leadership about 
relevant European issues (ibid: 39-40).  She discusses the changing role of the TUC in Europe 
as it lobbied differing interests in Europe arguing that the: 
 
 
…TUC’s European strategy, first presented in its 1988 policy paper ‘Maximising the 
Benefits Minimising the Costs’, centered on ensuring that the European social dimension 
was developed to the greatest extent possible and that unemployment resulting from the 
transition to (and increased competition from) the Single Market would be as 
insignificant as possible (ibid: 42) 
 
 
The multi-sector GMB and Graphical, Paper and Media Union (GPMU) also had Brussels 
offices (Hyman, 2017).  However, many, especially since the increasingly neo-liberal 
direction of EU policy, have questioned the effectiveness of union lobbying efforts compared 
to multinationals.  For example, Waddington (2011: 208) reports that ‘Unionists grudgingly 
acknowledge[d] the efficacy of the employers lobbying of the Commission to dilute the terms 
of the Draft [recast European Works Council] Directive’.  This reduction in union influence is 
also reflected at a national level.  According to Culpepper and Regan (2014: 743) 
governments in the European periphery may not believe that ‘ …unions are worth the trouble 
of bringing in to privileged negotiation.  They can be treated as just one interest group among 
many’. 
A second mode of engagement has been through transnational European campaigns.  
Although, Bieler and Erne (2015) note that a European trade union campaign with regard to 
EU austerity reforms had been difficult to organise they highlight the success of factory 
workers in France, Greece and Italy.  More specifically, Fox-Hodess (2017) discusses the 
European dockworkers union campaigns.  Here Portuguese, Greek and English engaged in 
‘…an institutionalized form of rank-and-file internationalism…’ (ibid: 627).  Interestingly, 
the UK (Liverpool dockworkers) was central to this from the start, with local workplace 
campaign co-ordination critical.  Overall, though, problems aligning national union interests 
frustrate international co-operation, as Hyman (2017) notes when discussing the role of UK 
unions during the formation of the European Trade Union Confederation.  Martínez Lucio 
(2010: 541) has also recently commented ‘…labour internationalism(s) …is (are) born out of 
capitalism and its contours’.  He notes a complex and multi-layered process based on four 
main dimensions, the sectoral and labour process; the ideological context; the character of 
networks, so their logic and form; and the national identities of participants, and ‘the 
regulatory politics of their contexts’. 
A third mode of European engagement has been through social dialogue based on EU 
Directives (e.g. the EWC Directive) and framework agreements through European Social 
Dialogue (ESD) and European Sector Social Dialogue (ESSD) (see Begega and Aranea, 
2018; Marginson and Keune, 2012).  Collaboration here has extended beyond leadership and 
senior officers to involve junior officers and ordinary members.  This has encouraged the 
development of formal and informal representative networks leading in some cases to 
successful solidarity and recruitment campaigns.  For example, Bieler and Erne (2017: 215) 
highlight a successful transnational campaign that involved 40,000 European workers staging 
a one-day strike against the closure of a GM plant in Luton (UK).  Fitzgerald and Stirling 
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(2010: 321) recount a successful EWC influenced recruitment campaign at a call centre in 
Sunderland (North East of England), a Unison respondent here states ‘…nationally we could 
do little, internationally we achieved everything’.  Whittall et al. (2017) discuss Volkswagen’s 
transnational company agreements (TCAs) negotiated jointly by their EWC and Global 
Works Council.  These TCAs related to both labour relations and temporary agency work and 
were highlighted as a positive development at the Bentley car plant in Crewe (North West of 
England).  Interestingly, the UK locations noted here each had EU Referendum Leave votes 
returned (Luton 56%, Sunderland 61% and Crewe 56%).  For members then perhaps the free 
movement of labour has overshadowed these potentially positive European engagements, 
influencing the vote to Leave the EU (see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017 for a wider discussion 
of immigration and the vote).  The May 2004 accession of Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) workers was significant as by June 2016 some three million two hundred thousand 
CEE workers had been issued national insurance numbers (DWP, 2004-2016) and were able 
to work. 
To present this in terms of a framing analysis (Goffman, 1974), austerity in working class 
communities, and workplaces and pressure on public services (McKenzie 2017) comprised 
the fundamental contextual issue.  This was falsely attributed to migration by government, 
politicians and newsmedia (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017) and allied to concerns about 
funding paid to the EU.  As Hyman (2010: 6) notes ‘…referendum campaigns themselves 
may be of critical importance in structuring perceptions and in framing the questions at issue’.  
The referendum provided an opportunity for this framing to be embedded in working class 
communities by animating the Leave vote.  For according to Leave, the solution was to take 
back control of borders and leave the EU (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). 
By contrast, unions found it difficult to adequately frame the migration issue.  They were 
inclusive with CEE workers (Fitzgerald and Hardy, 2010) including creating local union 
structures and support to encourage CEE union membership (see for example Aziz, 2015; 
Ciupijus et al., 2018).  However, challenges were also evident, including perceived special 
treatment provided to particular groups (Mustchin, 2012).  The most publicised example of 
localised trade union opposition to free movement came with the ‘British Jobs for British 
Workers’ dispute at the Lindsey Oil refinery.  Here seemingly strong xenophobic attitudes 
were expressed by trade union members in the GMB and multi-sector Unite.  This dispute, 
though, was part of a longer running issue with the neoliberal turn of the Posting of Workers 
Directive (PWD) (see Fitzgerald, 2010) and significantly, as noted by Meardi (2012) was 
supported by some Italian trade unionist that understood ‘…the British protesters’.  As well as 
actually including ‘…locally resident Polish workers’ (ibid: 113).  This PWD neoliberal turn 
chimed with the ongoing left critique of neoliberal Europe (see discussion of Culpepper and 
Regan, 2014).  This echoes the market promoting features identified by unions opposing 
membership in 1975 (Whyman, 2008).  Recent, powerful evidence here includes a limit to 
state subsidy and enforced competition, such as the introduction of the fourth railway package 
two months prior to the UK EU Referendum (see De Francesco and Castro, 2018 for further 
discussion).  In any event, as the EU expanded to take in low-wage and poorly organised 
economies from the 1990s so the vulnerability of ‘social Europe’ to ‘social dumping’ 
increased and with it the potential support for Brexit.  Waddington (2005) and Rubery (2011) 
discuss this vulnerability, identifying tensions between the European social model and the 
wider neoliberal policy framework.  Rubery concludes that there is a ‘…reconstruction of 
social models …and deconstruction to implement neoliberalism’ (ibid: 671). 
Overall, though, this does not mean members move to the right, Mosimann et al. (2019) 
highlight union membership can be a barrier to support for radical right wing parties.  They 
detail studies differentiated by county, class and data method such as the European Social 
Survey (ESS) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.  Their survey (involving some 
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1,839 UK respondents) found union members less likely to support right wing parties such as 
the UK Independence Party (UKIP).  Béthoux et al. (2018) do suggest that both French and 
Irish unions and workers have become more Eurosceptic.  Whereas, Hyman’s (2010) analysis 
of European integration initiatives noted that surveys of ‘core’ union members (manual and to 
some extent white-collar workers) have often opposed EU integration.  Union leaderships 
have become more pro-European he concludes therefore that members are ‘…clearly out of 
step with the policies of their unions’ (ibid: 21).  It is against this background that we set out 
to investigate the thinking of union leaders before and after the UK EU Referendum. 
 
 
Method 
 
Our research aims were to examine:  (1) The key influences on material and argumentative 
resources in trade unions on both sides of the Referendum campaign including the UK main 
union federation the TUC, and (2) post-Referendum evaluations of the effectiveness of trade 
union campaigning.  This required us to generate synchronous data from respondents who 
were central to the trade unions’ Referendum campaigns.  In line with similar small scale, 
phenomenologically informed research, whilst we presupposed that our data might enable 
theoretical insight we neither aimed nor claim generalisability to wider populations. 
These aims required a purposive sample (Guest et al., 2006; Patton, 2015), comprising 
senior trade union officers with campaigning responsibility at national and regional levels.  
The common constraints of credibility, time and resource that attend studies with key 
informants (Patton, 2015) were particularly acute.  Since accountability structures and 
responsibility for political campaigning varies across unions and research data needed to be 
captured during the Referendum campaign, the first named author exercised considerable 
flexibility to undertake interviews when respondents enjoyed limited availability.  As is 
common with purposive sampling, brokers are necessary to facilitate high-level access and a 
senior TUC figure undertook this role.  Although the numbers of respondents (11 – Table 1) 
is slightly lower than is common in work-based phenomenological studies (Saunders and 
Townsend, 2016), the seniority and credibility of respondents enabled the initial research 
objectives to be met.  In line with the Ethical Approval granted by our institution, respondents 
were offered the opportunity of anonymity.  All but three waived this and whilst some 
respondents are identifiable by role, those who asked for anonymity are not.  Initial interviews 
were conducted in the immediate run-up to the Referendum in May and June 2016 and a 1 
signifies quotes from these in the findings.  Follow – up interviews were undertaken 
following the Referendum in late 2016 and early 2017 and a 2 signifies quotes from these in 
the findings. 
 
Table 1.  Research Respondents 
Trade Union / TUC  Position  Level  Policy 
Associated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen (ASLEF) 
 Senior Official dealing 
with Referendum 
 National  Leave 
Bakers, Food and Allied 
Workers' Union (BFAWU) 
 General Secretary  National  Leave 
National Union of Rail,  Senior Official dealing  National  Leave 
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Maritime and Transport 
Workers (RMT) 
with Referendum 
National Union of Teachers 
(NUT)i 
 Deputy General Secretary/ 
General Secretaryii 
 National  Neutral 
Broadcasting, 
Entertainment, 
Communications and 
Theatre Union (BECTU)iii 
 Research Officer and ex 
President 
 National  Remain 
TUC  Head of EU and 
International Relations 
Department 
 National  Remain 
TUC  Regional Secretary, 
Yorkshire and the Humber 
TUC (Y&HTUC) 
 Regional  Remain 
TUC  Regional Secretary, 
Southern and Eastern 
Region TUC (SERTUC) 
 Regional  Remain 
Unison  Assistant General 
Secretary 
 National   Remain 
Unite  Assistant General 
Secretary and TUC lead on 
Europe 
 National  Remain 
Union of Shop, Distributive 
and Allied Workers 
(USDAW) 
 Senior Official dealing 
with Referendum 
 National  Remain 
 
Semi-structured interviews enabled the collection of descriptive information whilst also 
offering an opportunity for respondents to examine relevant rationales.  Questions examined 
policy formation and influences, campaign scale, campaign media, structure and themes.  The 
questions for the second set of semi-structured interviews were more limited, offering 
interviewees the opportunity to reflect on their campaigns and to evaluate their effectiveness.  
Whilst a common bank of interview questions was used, some variation enabled particular 
issues from respondents’ first interviews to be reconsidered.  Analysis of data was conducted 
in a non-linear and iterative fashion with insights generated concurrently through the data 
collection process.  Themes that emerged strongly from particular interviews (e.g. through 
repetition and emphasis) were checked against the results of others to examine areas of 
similarity and difference.  The themes that emerged strongly as the key influences on material 
and argumentative resources in the first set of interviews then informed the generation of 
questions in the second set.  These themes are: 
 
Theme 1: Purpose – Pragmatic Europeanism 
 
Theme 2: Member – Leader Relationships  
 
Theme 3: Communications – Messaging and Campaigning 
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Findings: The Referendum campaign 
 
Pragmatic Europeanism 
 
Social Europe and two of the three main strands discussed (EU policy and social dialogue) 
were noted by a number of our respondents.  However, Mathers et al.’s (2018) description of 
mainstream British unions as pragmatic Europeans for whom policy towards Europe depends 
upon a judgment about members’ interests can be confirmed in this research and echoes 
throughout the findings.  As the likelihood of a Referendum strengthened from 2010, the TUC 
and affiliates developed and/or confirmed policy through successive conferences, with the 
RMT’s Pro-Leave motions to TUC Congress heavily defeated in 2012 and 2013.  Following 
the election of a majority Tory government with a manifesto commitment to a referendum 
two motions appeared at the 2015 Congress with USDAW supporting Remain but the GMB 
argued for a pause to await the outcome of Prime Minister Cameron’s renegotiation of 
Britain’s membership.  Neither motion was pressed as Congress endorsed a General Council 
compromise but in the event, most unions followed the GMBs ‘wait and see’ approach with a 
number postponing their decisions until their spring conferences just weeks before the 
Referendum.  At that time trade unions were also dealing with the draft Trade Union Act 
2016.  However, this was not highlighted as an issue that stopped or interfered with the launch 
of campaigning.  In fact only the BFAWU respondent highlighted the Act, stating that it was 
evidence of the failure of social Europe.  The mainstream unions and TUC policy of ‘wait and 
see’ kept open the option of Leave and was consistent with their longstanding pragmatism: 
 
 
So we have looked at the EU and asked if it is good for workers.  So in 1975 it was not 
and in the 1980s it changed with the social side, so we were against the EU when it was 
just the Common Market.  So for us it is about is it good for workers. (TUC National–1) 
 
 
This emphasis chimed with reluctance to engage the arguments of the official Remain 
campaign.  The pro-Remain unions were consistent in claiming that the aims of their 
Referendum campaigns were both to move the terms of the debate to those that mattered to 
workers and to make the argument for Remain on the basis of workers’ interests: 
 
 
We are not going in to this discussion on their turf but on our turf. (Unite–1) 
 
 
Although most trade union executives chose to refer the final decision on the Referendum.  
Unison was an exception choosing to engage directly with members and branches before 
confirming decisions to both engage in and take a side in the Referendum.  Whilst this was 
understood as involving risk: 
 
 
It was the best survey we have ever conducted; it had the greatest reach we have ever 
conducted on a policy issue and the BBC noted this was the largest survey of working 
people done during the Referendum. (Unison–1) 
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The Unison consultation does demonstrate that one large union endeavoured to frame their 
campaign to issues identified by members.  The consultation involved approximately 60,000 
members and concluded that members feared losing a number of employment rights and 
further cuts in public services if Brexit occurred.  The survey also identified that 78% of 
surveyed members wanted them to have a position in the Referendum with an overwhelming 
majority of these stating Remain (95%)iv.  The TUC decided against declaring its position 
until this consultation was completed and once campaigning began, TUC regions seemingly 
had little or no resources to co-ordinate campaigns.  In Yorkshire and the Humber for 
example, a total spend of just £180 was incurred ‘boards for street stalls and meetings’ 
(Y&HTUC–1). 
Decisions on registering with the Electoral Commission depended on whether unions 
anticipated expenditure exceeding £10,000 (in the event both Fire Brigades Union and 
construction union UCATT registered but did not exceed this).  Union scale and the 
availability of political funds, following an expensive general election and against a dire 
financial background (Willman et al., 2016) were significant influences on spend and hence 
campaign strategy (Table 2).  No simple relationship is apparent between union scale or 
policy and the intensity of their campaigning, as measured by expenditure per member though 
some small unions including BWAFU deliberately spent below the registration limit.  The 
pro-Leave RMT spent most per head whilst the CWU spent a larger proportion of its income 
than other unions. 
 
Table 2.  Total declared EU Referendum spend, union members and income 
Trade Union Policy EU registered 
Spend1 
Membership2 Pence per 
member3 
% of income4 
RMT Leave £45,082.74 83,854 54p 0.20% 
Community Remain £11,324.51 26,980 42p 0.15% 
CWU Remain £86,543.14 191,912 45p 0.28% 
GMB Remain £96,430.45 622,596 15p 0.13% 
Unison Remain £461,084.01 1,255,653 37p 0.23% 
Unite Remain £140,173.15 1,382,126 10p 0.08% 
USDAW Remain £104,192.72 440,603 24p 0.26% 
TUC Remain £97,908.92     51   –    – 
1. Electoral Commission (2017);  2. Certification Office (2017);  3. Pence per member 
spent on Referendum;  4. Proportion of income spent on Referendum. 
 
Member – Leader Relationships 
 
As Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2019) note, serious tensions around the coherence of 
leaders’ and members positions are an ongoing feature of union democracy.  The anticipation 
of consequences for leader-member relations was a significant influence on unions whose 
leadership supported Remain.  This manifested in different ways; so for some it justified 
neutrality and for others an even-handedness in the presentation of arguments.  Despite its 
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2015 conference having rejected a Leave motion, the NUTs’ Executive opted for neutrality 
and suggested that this should have been the position in the movement more widely ‘…as 
their memberships would be so divided on this that taking a clear cut position either way 
might have an impact on membership’ (NUT–1).  Whilst BECTU took a Remain position but 
their attempted even-handedness in communications was likewise predicated on a desire not 
to alienate members.  This influenced the decision to limit their campaigning to a single 
‘sensitive’ bulk email ‘…as we do not wish to upset those in favour of leaving’ (BECTU–1).  
The TUC also attempted to maintain a degree of balance between Remain and Leave at both 
national and regional level: 
 
 
We try to be balanced by giving EU negatives and positives.  Given the Electoral 
Commission regulations, we have been careful in getting involved in the workplace 
campaigns.  So we have put out national and sometimes regional information and allowed 
others to campaign at local levels. (TUC National–1) 
 
 
By contrast, ASLEF were confident that members and leaders’ opposition to the EU aligned 
with their wider political orientation, to fight neoliberalism as represented by the EU 4th 
Railway Package.  Confident in members’ understanding of the union’s position, they 
incurred no expenditure with their only activity being the General Secretary’s speaking 
engagements and members’ support for the RMTs day of action leafleting railway passengers.  
They contrasted their confidence in members’ support with that of other unions who 
undertook member consultation ‘…we lead as a union and do not do focus groups’ (ASLEF–
1). 
 
 
Communications - Messaging and campaigning 
 
The third theme was most prominent and this related to the effectiveness of different kinds of 
messaging and a variety of frustrations influencing campaigning; some of these were mutually 
implicative.  Overall trade unions’ Referendum campaigns varied in policy, intensity, scope 
and priorities.  Although, amongst our sample, Unite, Unison, USDAW and the RMT 
committed resources, as did the national TUC.  In respect of campaign themes, a difference 
emerged between pro-Remain unions with Unite framing theirs differently, placing far more 
emphasis on migration than other unions whose focus was predominantly the protection of 
employment rights.  But echoing Whyman’s (2008) findings smaller, sectoral unions made 
specific arguments about the impact of the Referendum results on inter alia rail, ferries and 
the film industry whilst larger unions and the TUC focussed on generic arguments (see Table 
3).  Some social media campaigning was undertaken by Unison and the TUC whilst 
traditional methods (leaflets and meetings) predominated elsewhere. 
 
Significantly, delay in taking a position until Spring conferences left little time to take 
decisions on registration, to hone messages and to respond to increasing hostility to migration 
at a local shop floor level.  The issues this generated for Remain unions manifested in a 
variety of ways, including employers’ refusal to allow meetings on their premises (e.g. Tesco) 
and activists’ desire to make the argument in workplaces: 
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…depends on the industries.  Those industries that are heavily reliant on foreign 
investment and exports, particularly to Europe saw a vested interest in a continuing 
relationship with the European Union, there we had support in the main from the shop 
stewards … but as soon as you started to talk about how members would vote … it was 
very clear that huge numbers were going to vote Leave   …  Did not matter where you 
went, you could be in Cardiff or Bristol or Hull or Newcastle it did not matter.  You 
would get the same questions; they were saying it with such conviction that you had to 
believe that they actually shared some of the views as our members. (Unite–1) 
 
 
Table 3.  Main arguments referenced by respondents in campaigns/interviews 
Remain–Arguments Trade Union Leave–Arguments Trade Union 
EU membership boosts 
jobs and pay (Inward 
investment depends on 
access to market) 
BECTU; 
TUC; Unison; 
Unite; Usdaw 
Bosses Europe (post 
demise of Eastern bloc) 
and cannot be changed 
RMT 
EU provides jobs 
protection in cultural sector 
BECTU                     –     – 
Tory government would 
sign neoliberal trade deals 
if we leave / undermine the 
NHS 
BECTU; 
TUC; Unison; 
Unite 
EU forces marketization of 
public services/prevents 
renationalisation 
ASLEF; RMT 
Global challenges (Climate 
Change / Automation/ Tax 
Avoidance / Wealth 
Redistribution) require 
multilateral response 
TUC; Unite  
                    – 
 
    – 
Workers rights’ secured by 
EU (Health and Safety, 
Maternity Pay) 
BECTU; 
TUC; Unison; 
Unite; Usdaw 
EU ‘social’ Directives only 
layout a skeleton and UK 
also has exemptions 
ASLEF; 
BFAWU 
EWCs Unite                    –     – 
Only way to reform EU 
from the inside 
TUC; Unite EU has done nothing to 
prevent the spread of zero-
hours contracts 
BFAWU 
                –       – Against social dialogue as 
an ‘industrial union’ 
ASLEF 
                –       – Bring back ‘protective’ 
legislation 
RMT 
EU will make leaving 
difficult 
BECTU Money spent in the EU that 
could be spent in the UK 
BFAWU 
Maintain free movement BECTU; TUC                    –     – 
Opposed ‘myths’ on 
migration 
TUC; Unite; 
Usdaw 
                   –     – 
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Post-war peace BECTU; 
TUC; Unite 
                   –     – 
 
Surprise at the vehemence of members’ hostility was a regular feature of interviews during 
the campaign.  The TUC Yorkshire and Humber reported that: 
 
 
People are now more willing to raise issues on a nationalistic basis.  You know “I have 
lived here all my life and I can’t get this because …” and trying to argue with someone 
from a deprived area that migrants might help them … (Y&HTUC–1) 
 
 
Likewise, USDAW, whose branch representatives had been confident that migration would 
not be an issue, found that: 
 
 
… the two issues from USDAW members are workers coming from Poland and those 
areas and taking British workers’ jobs.  Now with some of this it is out and out racism but 
with others it is a genuine case of bad employers getting away with it. (USDAW–1) 
 
 
Concern as to the direction that the campaign had taken was exacerbated by encounters 
between union officials and members; for example at a Unite workplace in Derby (a Leave 
voting area 57%) a pro-Remain battle-bus was ‘wrecked’ by pro-Leave members.  
Significantly, Unite have been highlighted as an inclusive union supporting CEE workers 
(Fitzgerald and Hardy, 2010).  Further, the decision of ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ to include 
Frances O’Grady (TUC General Secretary) as a speaker in the final televised debatev was both 
welcomed and seen as portentous: 
 
 
At the beginning of the campaign I don’t think there was a chance in hell that Frances 
would have been that prominent in the final line up but it became clear that actually that 
is where the battle needed to be fought. (TUC National–2) 
 
 
Unison and Unite, Britain’s two largest unions took different views of the need to combat 
arguments about migration during the campaign.  Unison’s consultation results had shown 
migration to be insignificant as an issue and so whilst this was a ‘worry’ it was not a ‘game 
changer’.  Unite, though, did consider this and austerity as issues but they were not adequately 
anchored (Goffman, 1974: 247) as recognised in the next section: 
 
 
… we have approached this head-on; you cannot avoid it.  So we are out there arguing 
that it is an ideological austerity programme that is forcing the NHS into crisis so that 
they can privatise it.  So there was research done that showed that where there is a 10% 
concentration of migrants in a community, NHS Waiting Lists are nine days lower than 
elsewhere (see Giutella et al. 2015).  Migrants tend to be younger, healthier, at work, not 
so reliant on the NHS and care services … It is not migrants who have brought down 
terms and conditions it is abusive, exploitative employers. (Unite–1) 
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Unite’s campaign, alone of the unions we spoke with, specifically targeted these messages at 
East Midlands, Hull and other areas with migrant working communities.  By contrast Unison, 
convinced that their members would predominantly support Remain, prioritised campaigns to 
encourage members to register to vote (as many as 300,000 were thought to be off the 
electoral register) targeting their 60,000 young members through social media.  This also 
involved sharing membership data with electoral data pooled from the major political parties 
in the ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ campaign.  This data drop led to the identification of 
140,000 Unison members in the key swing voter pool, to be targeted with ‘Britain Stronger in 
Europe’ material combatting Leave claims on the NHS: 
 
 
We are not just saying to people vote Remain, we are trying to address a number of the 
issues that have been highlighted to us.  So say to people these are the issues and when 
you vote, keep this in mind.  It is a gentle approach and tested; in the last election we 
asked people which way they would vote and used this approach, and then went back and 
got a 12% swing to Labour. (Unison–1) 
 
 
By contrast to this gentleness, arguments made by BFAWU on public expenditure chimed 
with the populist appeal of Leave campaign messages on increasing NHS spending ‘…it is to 
do with how money spent in the EU on membership could be spent in this country’ 
(BFAWU–1).  As noted pragmatism underpinned pro-Remain Union campaigns, which 
overwhelmingly emphasised both the employment rights guaranteed by EU membership 
(Maternity, Health and Safety, Working Time, Holiday Pay, Discrimination and TUPE being 
mentioned most often) and the need for EU reform and a return to the social model ‘…our 
position is not anti-EU, it is anti-direction of EU right now, it is anti-neoliberalism right now, 
anti-deregulations right now’ (Unite–1).  Indeed BECTU noted the failure to apply existing 
rights in teaching (working hours) and other sectors ‘…remember BECTU took Tony Blair to 
the ECJ because they didn’t want to fully implement the Working Time Directive’ (BECTU–
1).  Respondents on all sides identified that the argument that the EU could only be reformed 
from within gained little traction with members who wanted to Leave and the argument that 
the EU would impose a damaging Brexit deal fed into Leave’s narrative better than Remains.  
Whilst a EU sustaining post-war peace argument was significant to several respondents, its 
lack of impact amongst members was equally evident. Likewise arguments about EWCs had 
traction with campaigners but not most members. 
Not all unions focussed solely on the generic benefits of the EU however and sector 
specific arguments were evident in BECTU’s campaigning around protection for cultural 
programming, and for the advantages of free movement for members who were used to 
working in a trans-national film industry; general unions’ however produced little sector 
specific literature.  Likewise, the RMT cited specific examples of the EU’s neoliberalism in 
representing the EU as ‘bosses’ Europe’ (see McIlroy, 2018 for a wider discussion of Bob 
Crow’s influence here), which ‘…cannot be changed’ (RMT–1).  The example of Caledonian 
Ferries being put out to tender against the wishes of the Scottish Government proved a 
particularly useful example for unions committed to nationalisation of rail and maritime 
industries: 
 
 
What we are aiming for is one single public service that owns the entire rail service and 
its infrastructure, as well as, owns rail manufacture.  So essentially back to the old British 
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Rail [BR], for example much of the stock on the East Coast was built by BR.  EU 
Directives do not allow that anymore and what the EU proposes and has proposed runs 
directly in opposition to our nationalisation strategy (RMT–1) 
 
 
Evaluating the campaign 
 
To address our second Research Aim, we undertook interviews with respondents in late 2016 
and 2017 to examine their evaluations of the effectiveness of their campaigns.  This was 
influenced not only by the result but also by TUC polling in the immediate aftermath.  This 
revealed that overall 62% of the joint Remain and Leave sample agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement that ‘It is essential for the immigration system to reduce the number of 
migrants coming to Britain’ (Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, 2016: 9).  Significantly this included 
44% of Remain voters and 85% of Leave voters.  Such were the results that union 
campaigning to increase voter registration and turnout was itself regarded as counter-
productive inasmuch as people voting for the first time were regarded as overwhelmingly 
Leave voters (Unison).  
The majority of respondents did not believe that the unions could have altered the result, 
itself a significant admission of the weakness of the influence of union leadership on members 
(Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2019).  The Referendum provided a valve to release 
pressures that had been experienced by working people for years and perhaps even 
generations (see MacLeod and Jones, 2018; Telford and Wistow, 2019).  Post Referendum 
focus groups with which respondents had been involved had evidenced widespread confusion 
about both the European Union and the implications of the Leave vote.  In the context of 
widespread ignorance, members and voters more widely were considered to have paid 
particular attention to the features of the campaign that appeared clear to them.  In this context 
the promise that Leave would yield an additional investment of £350million a week for the 
NHS was considered pivotal: 
 
 
… We tried to supply people with simple facts about ‘don’t trust them with your NHS, 
there will be no NHS in 20 years’ time if we leave Europe.  But we just did not get 
anywhere because of the noise they were making with their £350million.  It was so 
effective and they knew it was effective from day one so they just kept on pushing it and 
pushing it. (Unison–2) 
 
 
Despite their differences in Referendum policy and the intensity and focus of their campaigns, 
two themes dominated the post-Referendum evaluation: Migration and Campaigning. 
 
 
Migration 
 
Respondents on both sides of the Referendum agreed that the result was framed by alienation 
from political elites, austerity and competition from EU workers.  Along with the actual 
extent of CEE migration, competition from EU workers also feeds into our earlier discussion 
of special union structures for CEE workers (Aziz, 2015; Ciupijus et al., 2018) as well as 
perceived special treatment (Mustchin, 2012).  These factors provided an audience for anti-
migration messages and made it difficult for members to appreciate the advantages of 
remaining: 
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Most people wanted to stop large invasions of low-skilled Europeans descending on their 
towns doing casual work; I think this [a Remain vote] could have been achieved if we 
had not been such a deregulated employment market. (Y&HTUC–2) 
 
 
Inasmuch as unions believed their own campaigns could have been more effective their 
choice of campaign issues was a repeated concern.  Union leaders universally underestimated 
the impact of the migration issue on the campaign and almost regardless of the focus they 
gave this (which, as we have seen varied), Remain respondents were particularly self-critical 
in respect of their failure to address migration directly enough or quickly enough: 
 
 
The message on immigration was weak and ambivalent and therefore would not attract 
those who called themselves Lexit if you like.  So for me the key campaign on the Leave 
side was immigration and we did not address it, we just kept quiet because we did not 
want to upset anybody. (SERTUC–2) 
 
 
Despite travelling the country to make the case that unscrupulous employers and lack of 
public investment were the causes of declining wages and failures in public services and not 
migrants, Unite’s respondent argued that their engagement on immigration was inadequate 
both before the campaign and in a failure to react to the issue as its importance became clearer 
during the campaign: 
 
 
[The union] …took a conscious decision not to raise the immigration debate, so we 
weren’t going to get into their turf on immigration.  So we wanted to run a positive 
campaign and we could have run a positive campaign about immigration of course but we 
decided not to run immigration focussed campaign … So we weren’t out there promoting 
the issue.  I think early on it became clear that immigration was the one thing. (Unite–2) 
 
 
In accounting for their failure to anticipate the importance and toxicity of the immigration 
debate, the USDAW respondent reflected on the failure of the assumption that the issues 
raised at conference would be a guide to the campaign.  As it turned out a quite different 
interpretation of delegates’ thinking was suggested by the contrast between the centrality of 
immigration to the Referendum debate and its absence during conference debate: 
 
 
…coming up to conference we were concerned that there would be a debate focussed on 
foreigners taking British jobs but it did not come through.  Nobody spoke against the 
statement to Conference about this; on reflection perhaps no one wanted to put their 
heads up above the parapet … I think this is one of the reasons I was lulled into as false 
sense of security. (Usdaw–2) 
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On the Leave side, while there was ‘no regret’ (ASLEF) about the union’s position there was 
an acknowledgment that campaigns could have done more to counter the anti-migration 
narrative: 
 
 
… perhaps our decision was on slightly parochial grounds and the outcome would 
demonstrate that and that perhaps a much, much bigger picture to consider.  That we did 
not take into account when we made our decision ... I think if we could go back in time 
the decision should have been made on a much broader perspective rather than just the 
individual factors we considered.  Given that our Executive is made up of very 
industrially minded individuals and not political it wasn’t surprising that we arrived at the 
decision we took. (ASLEF–2) 
 
 
Similarly, BWAFU believed that failure to counter anti-migration narratives was important: 
 
 
… members of the government blamed migration because they were failing on education, 
the health service and I don’t think the trade union movement was good enough on 
refuting those types of things.  Also in refuting the promises of Farage, Gove and Boris 
Johnson the lies from them about the £350 million and those sorts of things.  We should 
have been clearer that we are supporting Brexit to strengthen trade unions in 
…companies, so to push legislation through here rather than having to wait four or five 
years at a European level.  We should have made it clear to people that they weren’t 
going to get the £350 million.  This is not going to stop immigration that is not going to 
happen in ten years.’ (BFAWU–2) 
 
 
Union campaigns 
 
When considering their own campaigns, the most commonly repeated frustration concerned 
the delays to the launch of union campaigning.  The decision made by a number of unions to 
delay campaigning until the conclusions of Cameron’s renegotiation was compounded by 
taking recommendations to Spring conference despite policy being long established and no 
further derogations having been agreed: 
 
 
I don’t think we really kicked off big campaigning until the beginning of April and we 
probably should have been campaigning for three to six months before then to really have 
an impact and change people’s minds. (TUC National–2) 
 
 
Another concern was that despite unions on both sides wanting to run member-focussed 
campaigns, there was confusion as to the alliance of traditional enemies on the Remain side: 
 
 
I think it was a confusing coalition and again in retrospect should Labour have gone 
alone, could they have pulled in more votes by going alone?  Sharing platforms with 
David Cameron, Frances O’Grady with big business.  It is not how we have traditionally 
run campaigns and I don’t know if we confused people and put them off. (Unison–2) 
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Amongst both Remain and Leave unions a key lesson was accepted in the need to counter 
hostility to migrants and to channel members’ anger toward employers and government: 
 
 
This is the real enemy within.  What’s happening when they are taking away your 
overtime payments, when they are taking away your incentive bonus, if you have venom 
these are the people you should direct it to.  So we have started that campaign and at the 
moment it has been successful, we are getting people out saying ‘you are right’. 
(BFAWU–2) 
 
 
This theme chimed with the wider movement’s ‘workers must not pay the price for Brexit’ 
post-Referendum position.  At the same time, the TUC has established a panel of key 
convenors in private sector companies to keep a watching brief on their post-Brexit strategies: 
 
 
As with the financial crisis, obviously some of the things that were done were because we 
had a financial crisis and some of it was a convenient excuse for doing stuff that the 
company wanted to do anyway.  So we want to get a clearer view about what is actually a 
result of Brexit and what isn’t. (TUC National–2) 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
We would note that no two referendums ask the same question in the same set of socio-
economic circumstances.  Given this, it is unlikely that learning from one referendum will be 
readily transferrable to others, although the NUTs decision to remain neutral was influenced 
by their neutrality in the Scottish Independence Referendum.  However, what can be learnt is 
that campaigns need to be framed around specific examples and timescales for identifying 
issues, developing strategies and seeking to convince members collectively need to be longer.  
Here the weakening of unions’ bargaining strength informed campaigns and thus a greater 
willingness to support European regulation that protected workers’ interests and hence 
European institutions (Hyman, 2008).  During interviews Remain respondents noted the 
importance of a social Europe and the need to protect workers’ rights, although, Leave 
respondents were critical of a neoliberal EU.  This focus though meant that regardless of the 
side they took, unions maintained the pragmatic presuppositions that had informed them in 
1975; namely that their position would be principally informed by the interests of members.  
This informed a determination, on both sides of the argument, to focus campaigning on what 
they believed to be members’ interests and those of workers more widely.  Although, this 
distinguished their arguments from the largely ‘blue on blue’ national campaigns in order to 
shift wider attention towards issues of employment.  Pro-Remain unions’ attempts to frame 
the campaign in terms of employment rights was at odds with members who framed it in 
terms of migration in the context of austerity. 
Interestingly, respondents reported that members’ understanding of, and receptivity to, 
arguments for free trade increased in export-focused workplaces or amongst workers whose 
routine experience involved working across borders (BECTU).  Further, with the two Leave 
unions ASLEF and RMT, ‘regaining control’ was counterposed to the increasing 
marketisation of the EU (EU 4th Railway Package).  In their view, a sovereign British 
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Parliament provided a clear line of sight and the opportunity for the re-nationalisation of the 
railway system.  For the NUT, though, the Referendum had little priority, as EU-driven 
employment protection had been ineffective, especially over working hours.  Other disputes 
were of more immediate importance to members (see Stevenson, 2015 who discusses these 
neoliberal government reforms).  As noted it seems that for many members the effects of 
austerity in working class communities, reduced terms and conditions, and EU free movement 
(Coderre-LaPalme and Greer, 2017; Telford and Wistow, 2019), negated any positive 
outcomes from trade union policy initiatives in the EU.  Perhaps more importantly here it 
seems that the types of ‘localised’ transnational engagements identified (Bieler and Erne, 
2015; Fitzgerald and Stirling, 2010 and Whittall et al., 2017) either remain short in the 
memory or have involved too few members. 
As significant was the lateness of union campaign engagements with members, which 
may have provided an opportunity to better frame issues and indeed counter any ‘lies’ (the 
£350 million) or migration myths.  The pro-Remain union leaders and officials in our sample 
were dismayed at their inability to counter the argument that leaving the EU would provide 
extra resources for the NHS (the £350 million).  Thus despite long-standing union positions 
towards the EU the decision to wait for Cameron’s renegotiation and then for spring 
conferences delayed the start of campaigning.  The subsequent intensity and focus of 
campaigning varied widely between unions.  Whilst the RMT spent heavily per member and 
both Unison and Unite committed significant resource, other unions on both sides of the 
argument spent little, citing financial constraints or lack of priority.  Data from the Electoral 
Commission confirms that this pattern was replicated in the wider movement; the vast 
majority of unions spent below the £10,000 reporting limit.  This may corroborate Willman et 
al. (2016) in arguing that unions’ precarious financial position militates against participation 
in campaigns.  But also underpinning this was a concern not to alienate members, to divide 
union leaderships from the membership but this was seemingly starker in Remain unions.  
The fear of alienating members figured in the TUC’s attempts to provide ‘balance’, and in the 
cautious tone of member mailings.  Members’ divisions were also understood to have 
frustrated campaigning at workplaces with the anger and hostility of Leave supporting 
members being reported back through branches and shop stewards throughout.  Likewise a 
number of employers were reluctant to facilitate union pro-Remain campaigning; especially 
in retail, for fear of alienating employees and customers.  These fears were informed by a 
vituperative campaign and the divisions this provoked and exposed.  For both unions and 
employers the risks of arguing for Remain acted as a significant constraint on public 
pronouncements and support.  The fear that general unions’ leadership would be disconnected 
from members (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2019) found strong support from ASLEF 
and the RMT who contrasted relationships between their own executives and members with 
those of general unions. ASLEF’s opinion of Unison’s use of focus groups was especially 
scathing. 
Overall, though, as reported by respondents, free movement and a concern about 
migration were central during engagements with members.  In explaining their failure to 
anticipate this they highlighted inadequacies in internal communications and culture that led 
to members not ‘putting their heads above the parapet’ to explain concerns.  Likewise, local 
activists’ reports of the importance of migration during the campaign indicated that some 
activists shared members’ views but were unprepared to voice them as their own.  Thus as 
well as ESD, ESSD and specifically EWCs not seemingly making an impression it seems that 
the recent national and local activities of many unions with regard to CEE workers (Aziz, 
2015; Ciupijus et al., 2018; Fitzgerald and Hardy, 2010) had left little or a negative 
impression on members (Mustchin, 2012).  Increasing awareness of the importance of 
migration for Leave-voting members provoked divergent responses.  Whilst Unison’s 
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extensive branch consultation before the Referendum had led them to conclude that migration 
would not be a critical issue, Unite decided to respond to ‘myths’ around migration but even 
in their case did not raise the issue.  Such was the depth of shock and in some cases revulsion 
at the result and its aftermath that union leaders and senior officers, on both sides of the 
argument, have realised that a failure to engage more fully in the debate about migration aided 
the nationalist and sometimes racist narrative that was associated with it.  It was recognised 
that this was a critical error therefore we reach two final conclusions. 
The first is that the issues that framed Referendum campaigns did not address members 
concerned about migration and this has a wider application for future campaigns of all types.  
Here there is strong evidence that trade unions clearly did not have broad enough migration 
policies or initiatives.  What we mean by this is more effective engagement with non-migrant 
members’ cultural values and beliefs.  Trade unions have for a number of years administered 
anti-racist programmes, which have indeed increased following the EU Referendum.  All are 
important but the types we seek to highlight and argue for are those that are widely applicable 
and engage with misunderstandings of race and racial terms taking into account non-migrant 
cultural values and beliefs.  For example, Unison and more particularly the TUC are currently 
providing programmes with Show Racism the Red Cardvi.  Anti-racist ambassadors 
programmes encourage both workplace representatives and members to express antagonistic 
opinions of migrants or indeed immigrants.  Then Show Racism the Red Card trainers 
facilitate open and honest discussions about these views, providing facts and other scenario 
information.  Antagonistic opinions include racist views and terminology, which are allowed 
and expressed during an amnesty period.  One of the key learning outcomes is that issues such 
as this have to be engaged with, discussed, understood and hopefully resolved, with 
discussion and communication the key. 
Secondly, earlier engagement with non-migrant members’ cultural values and beliefs can 
contribute to issue framing and the mobilisation of members.  This is applicable generally for 
unions.  The reality with our study was, though, that both general unions and the TUC mainly 
concentrated their messaging at a national level arguing broadly about employment rights and 
the importance of the EU in their protection.  Whilst within sector specific unions, arguments 
on both sides were far more likely to be illustrated by material examples that resonated with 
workers’ own experience (e.g. BECTU working on film sets in EU member states, or RMT 
having ferry services privatised).  This suggests that the effectiveness of particular union 
campaigns is undermined by not seeking to engage either at an early stage or on an ongoing 
basis with the membership.  Campaign mobilisations are enhanced with engagements and 
training such as the union Show Racism the Red Card programmes.  But of course ongoing 
co-ordination and communication with those who have competed training need to either be 
established or maintained. 
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